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 Rhetorical Hermeneutics
 Steven Mailloux
 The Space Act of 1958 begins, "The Congress hereby declares that it is
 the policy of the United States that activities in space should be devoted
 to peaceful purposes for the benefit of all mankind." In March 1982, a
 Defense Department official commented on the statute: "We interpret
 the right to use space for peaceful purposes to include military uses of
 space to promote peace in the world."' The absurdity of this willful
 misinterpretation amazed me on first reading, and months later it readily
 came to mind when I was looking for an effective way to illustrate the
 politics of interpretation. With just the right touch of moral indignation,
 I offered my literary criticism class this example of militaristic ideology
 blatantly misreading an antimilitaristic text.
 "But ... the Defense Department is right!" objected the first student
 to speak. Somewhat amused, I spent the next ten minutes trying, with
 decreasing amusement, to show this student that the Reagan adminis-
 tration's reading was clearly, obviously, painfully wrong. I pointed to the
 text. I cited the traditional interpretation. I noted the class consensus,
 which supported me. All to no avail. It was at this point that I felt the
 "theoretical urge": the overwhelming desire for a hermeneutic account
 to which I could appeal to prove my student wrong. What I wanted was
 a general theory of interpretation that could supply rules outlawing my
 student's misreading.
 This little hermeneutic fable introduces the three topics of my essay.
 One topic is the theoretical moment that concludes the narrative; another
 is the simple plot, a brief rhetorical exchange; and finally there's the institutional
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 setting (a university classroom) in which the exchange takes place. These
 three topics preoccupy the sections that follow. Section 1 analyzes the
 problems resulting from the theoretical urge, the impasse of contemporary
 critical theory. Section 2 proposes my solution to this impasse, a solution
 I call rhetorical hermeneutics, which leads in section 3 to a rhetorical
 version of institutional history.
 1
 The theoretical urge is a recurrent phenomenon within the present
 organization of American literary studies. For within that discipline, the
 task of explicating individual texts remains the privileged activity; and,
 historically, this primary task has always brought in its wake a secondary
 one: critical practice inevitably leads to its self-conscious justification in
 critical theory. Every time a new challenger to the critical orthodoxy
 comes along, the discipline's theoretical discourse renews itself in an
 attempt to provide a rationale for interpretation. In simplified form, the
 institutional catechism during the last forty years has gone something
 like this: What is the purpose of literary studies as an institutionalized
 discipline? To produce knowledge about literature. How can this best
 be accomplished? By doing explications of texts. What should be the
 goal of explication? To discover the correct interpretation, the meaning
 of the text.2 Once the theoretical dialogue gets this far, the agreement
 among theorists begins breaking down. How can we guarantee that critics
 produce correct interpretations? Formalists respond, "By focusing on the
 text"; intentionalists, "By discovering the author's meaning"; reader-re-
 sponse critics, "By describing the ideal reader's experience"; and so on.
 As dissimilar as these theoretical answers appear, they all share a
 common assumption: validity in interpretation is guaranteed by establishing
 norms or principles for explicating texts, and such rules are best derived
 from an account of how interpretation works in general. In other words,
 most traditional theorists assume that an accurate theoretical description
 of interpreting will give us binding prescriptions for our critical practice,
 prescriptions that can assure (or at least encourage) correct readings.
 The classic statement of this assumption is E. D. Hirsch's in "Objective
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 Interpretation": "When the critic clearly conceives what a correct inter-
 pretation is in principle, he possesses a guiding idea against which he
 can measure his construction. Without such a guiding idea, self-critical
 or objective interpretation is hardly possible."3
 In this way, contemporary literary theory comes to focus on a question
 it takes as basic: How does interpretation-the accomplishment of mean-
 ing-take place? Two hermeneutic positions have developed in response
 to this central question: textual realism and readerly idealism. Hermeneutic
 realism argues that meaning-full texts exist independent of interpretation.
 From this perspective, meanings are discovered, not created. The facts
 of the text exist objectively, prior to any hermeneutic work by readers
 or critics, and therefore correct interpretations are those corresponding
 to the autonomous facts of the text. Realism often views the interpreter's
 mind as passive, simply acted upon by the words on the page. Though
 the text must be read, in correct interpretation it speaks itself. If the
 reader needs to do anything, it is only the mechanical activity of combining
 word meanings into larger thematic units and formal relationships. This
 is a "build-up" model of interpretation. For hermeneutic realism, texts
 are the primary source and test of readings; they constrain and ultimately
 determine interpretations.
 In contrast, hermeneutic idealism argues that interpretation always
 creates the signifying text, that meaning is made, not found. In this view,
 textual facts are never prior to or independent of the hermeneutic activity
 of readers and critics. Idealism claims not only that the interpreter's mind
 is active but that it is completely dominant over the text. There are no
 semantic or formal givens; all such textual givens are products of inter-
 pretive categories. This is a "build-down" model of interpretation. From
 this perspective, what counts as a correct reading depends entirely on
 shared assumptions and strategies, not autonomous texts. In hermeneutic
 idealism, a text doesn't constrain its interpretation; rather, communal
 interpretation creates the text.
 As theories of interpretation, textual realism and readerly idealism
 share a common institutional concern: to establish a foundation for val-
 idating knowledge. I call this an institutional concern because traditional
 theorists claim that, without principles of correct interpretation, an in-
 stitutionalized discipline has no way of grounding its production of new
 knowledge. Once again Hirsch is the paradigmatic theorist: he claims
 that, without a proper theory of correct interpretation, we cannot avoid
 "subjectivism and relativism" and cannot think of "literary study as a
 corporate enterprise and a progressive discipline."4 It follows from this
 view that theory serves the corporate enterprise by making explicit the
 norms and principles of valid readings. Any such theory attempts to
 derive these norms and principles from its general account of how inter-
 pretation works. Whether the account is realist, idealist, or some com-
 bination of the two, it must provide an intersubjective ground for correct
 Rhetorical Hermeneutics
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 interpretation, and it is traditionally thought that only by establishing
 such a ground can the dangers of relativism and subjectivism be avoided.
 With such a high value placed on intersubjective foundations for
 interpreting, it should come as no surprise that the concept of conventions
 plays an important-even central-role in hermeneutic accounts, whether
 realist or idealist.5 Thus, with some justification, the following discussion
 takes the conventionalist version of the realist/idealist debate as a synec-
 doche for all "foundationalist" arguments in recent critical theory.
 Theorists of the realist persuasion have long turned to textual con-
 ventions to explain literary interpretation. Formalists, intentionalists,
 structuralists, and even some reader-response critics locate conventions
 in a text in order to guarantee intersubjective foundations in their her-
 meneutic accounts. An especially interesting case of realist conventionalism
 can be found in the work of Monroe Beardsley, who with W. K. Wimsatt
 codified the prescriptions of New Critical formalism. In essays on the
 affective and intentional fallacies, Wimsatt and Beardsley proposed an
 "objective criticism" that would avoid the dangers of "impressionism,"
 "skepticism," and "relativism."6 In his Aesthetics, Beardsley later developed
 this formalism into a foundationalist theory, asking, "What are we doing
 when we interpret literature, and how do we know that we are doing it
 correctly?" and answering, "There are principles of explication for poetry
 in terms of which disagreements about the correctness of proposed ex-
 plications can be settled."7 These principles can be summed up in the
 realist's slogan "Back to the text."8
 Beardsley explains his realist hermeneutics further in The Possibility
 of Criticism, where he argues that the "literary text, in the final analysis,
 is the determiner of its meaning."9 At this point conventions enter into
 Beardsley's account. In his chapter "The Testability of an Interpretation,"
 he attempts to defend his formalist theory by arguing that "there really
 is something in the poem that we are trying to dig out, though it is
 elusive" (PC, p. 47). This "something"-the meaning in the text-is the
 object of interpretation, and Beardsley proposes to define it more rigorously
 by appropriating the conventionalism of speech-act theory. In another
 place, Beardsley succinctly describes J. L. Austin's account of language
 use: "To know what illocutionary action [requesting, promising, asserting,
 and so on] was performed is to know what action the production of such
 a text generated by the appropriate conventions."10
 Austin's conventionalism can be pushed in two very different direc-
 tions: toward readerly idealism, with conventions placed in hearers, or
 toward textual realism, with conventions posited in texts. Predictably,
 Beardsley's adaptation of speech-act theory takes the realist route. Rather
 than having speakers or hearers "take responsibility" for performing
 certain illocutionary acts and for committing themselves to certain con-
 ventional conditions (for example, in promising, that the speaker can do
 a certain act in the future), Beardsley prefers to say that literary texts
 Critical Inquiry
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 imitate illocutionary acts and-"represent" that certain conditions are in
 fact the case (PC, p. 115 n. 38). This is a shrewd maneuver: instead of
 readers taking responsibility for conventions of language use, texts rep-
 resent those conventions; conventions move from outside to inside the
 text. This realist placement of conventions gives Beardsleyjust what his
 formalist theory requires-an autonomous text against which all inter-
 pretations can be tested. "I am arguing that there are some features of
 the poem's meaning that are antecedent to, and independent of, the
 entertaining of an interpretive hypothesis; and this makes it possible to
 check such hypotheses against reality" (PC, pp. 57-58). And these semantic
 features that test interpretations include conventions embedded in the
 text.
 Realist theories like Beardsley's emphasize that conventions display
 shared practices for writing literature and that readers and critics must
 recognize these textual conventions in order to achieve valid interpretations.
 But such theories inevitably suffer from incomplete coverage and lack
 of specificity as exhaustive accounts of interpreting. No matter how com-
 prehensive it tries to be, the realist conventionalism of genre critics,
 formalists, and semioticians remains unsatisfying as a complete description
 of even a single text's literary meaning. The common notion of an artwork's
 irreducible uniqueness refuses to go away, even when a significant portion
 of the text's sense is attributable to an author following, modifying, or
 rejecting traditional conventions. But perhaps the literary text's uniqueness
 is simply an illusion fostered by the humanistic tradition, on the one
 hand, and supported by the needs of a critical profession, on the other.
 Even if this were the case and a text's meaning really could be explained
 as completely conventional, realist accounts would continue to be em-
 barrassed by their contradictory descriptions of the uninterpreted givens
 in the text and by their many unconvincing explanations of how such
 textual givens cause interpretations. Realist conventionalism only restates
 these essentialist and causal problems: How exactly are conventions man-
 ifested in the text? How do such textually embedded conventions determine
 interpretation? The latter question usually leads realists toward some
 kind of correspondence model: interpreters recognize conventions in a
 text because they have literary competence, an internalized set of in-
 terpretive conventions. 1 Realists who take this route move toward idealist
 solutions and in so doing also move toward idealist incoherencies.
 In contrast to realism, idealist theories emphasize conventions as
 shared practices for interpreting literature, conventions present in readers
 and critics, not in texts. Important idealist theories include those of Stanley
 Fish in "Interpreting the Variorum" and Jonathan Culler in Structuralist
 Poetics. Fish argues that communal interpretive strategies are the only
 constraints on the production of meaning. Texts are products of in-
 terpretive communities, which "are made up of those who share interpretive
 strategies not for reading ... but for writing texts, for constituting their
 Critical Inquiry June 1985
 properties."'2 In Structuralist Poetics, Culler more fully elaborates an idealist-
 oriented account of using conventions in interpretation. Though at times
 he refers to "potential" properties "latent" in the text itself, he more often
 emphasizes interpreters' reading conventions, which determine the sense
 they make of the literary work.13 He talks of the poem offering a structure
 for the reader to fill up, but he stresses the interpretive conventions
 competent readers use to invent something to fill up that structure. He
 suggests that it is not the text but the reading conventions that "make
 possible invention and impose limits on it."14
 While realist accounts posit textual conventions that are recognized
 by readers, idealist accounts place interpretive conventions in readers
 who then apply them to create meaningful texts. Idealists fare no better
 than realists, however, in using conventions to avoid epistemological
 embarrassment. True, they do avoid the realist problems connected with
 essentialism and causation by arguing that the content of the text is
 produced by the interpretive conventions employed and that texts do
 not cause interpretations at all. But entirely new problems arise out of
 these supposed solutions. The two most important involve the infinite
 regress of conventions and the unformalizable nature of context. In a
 particular case of interpretation, what determines the interpretive con-
 ventions to be used? Idealists cannot answer by proposing metaconventions,
 because this would lead to an infinite regress within their theories: each
 set of conventions at a lower level requires metaconventions at a higher
 level to determine the appropriate lower-level conventions. Then these
 metaconventions themselves need metaconventions, and so on. One way
 to avoid this pitfall is to argue that context always determines the in-
 terpretive conventions to employ. But such a claim only leads to a more
 difficult question for the idealist: What constrains the use of interpretive
 conventions in a specific context?
 Both Fish and Culler, among others, have recently suggested the
 impossibility of adequately answering this question. As they fully realize,
 such a suggestion entails a critique of their past conventionalist accounts
 of interpretation. I will limit my discussion here to Culler's recent ob-
 servation that the interpretive conventions on which he focused in Struc-
 turalist Poetics should be seen as part of a "boundless context."'5 Culler
 states his new position in this way: "Meaning is context-bound, but context
 is boundless" (OD, p. 123). Culler seems to be claiming two rather different
 things, only the first of which helps explain why the contextual nature
 of interpretation makes idealist conventionalism inadequate.
 Culler first seems to be arguing that any full account of meaning
 must include a notion of boundless context. By characterizing context
 as boundless, Culler means that any hermeneutic theory trying to specify
 a particular context exhaustively is doomed to failure: "Any given context
 is always open to further description. There is no limit in principle to
 what might be included in a given context, to what might be shown to
 625
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 be relevant to the interpretation of a particular speech act" ("CM," p.
 24). Every specification is open to questions asking for further specifi-
 cations.'6 In such an account, conventions are, at best, only first ap-
 proximations of boundless context. Conventions begin the specification
 of relevant contextual features, designating the relation of the words,
 persons, and circumstances required for a speech act to have the specific
 meaning it has in a given context (compare OD, p. 121).
 But conventions alone are inadequate as explanatory concepts. Either
 the description of the conventions must reductively and arbitrarily leave
 out relevant contextual features, or the specification of the relevant con-
 ventions would have to be so open-ended that conventions would become
 indistinguishable from context and lose their identity. A hermeneutic
 theory using conventions in conjunction with other contextual features
 will fare no better as an exhaustive account of meaning since there is no
 limit in principle to the features relevant to the interpretation of specific
 speech acts. Another way of putting this is to say that context is unfor-
 malizable. Any account that uses "context" to constrain interpretation
 thus has only two options: either it must simply name "context," "situation,
 or "circumstances" as a constraint and not elaborate any further, or it
 must carry out an infinite listing of all aspects of context and their in-
 terrelations, that is, bring everything in.'7 In other words, interpretive
 theories of context must either never begin the process of specification
 or never end it.
 Culler's first claim about boundless context agrees with what I have
 been saying so far: boundless context determines meaning, and context
 is boundless because it is ultimately not formalizable. Unfortunately,
 Culler confuses things with a second, entirely different argument about
 meaning and context, in which he asserts the "impossibility of ever sat-
 urating or limiting context so as to control or rigorously determine the
 'true' meaning" ("CM," p. 28). In this deconstructionist claim, context is
 boundless not in the first sense-that it is unformalizable-but in a
 second sense: new contexts can always be imagined for a particular speech
 act, and thus meaning is in principle radically indeterminate (see OD,
 pp. 124, 128). Culler ends up using context here as an interpretive device
 for making meaning undecidable rather than as an explanatory concept
 in accounting for meaning's determinate shape.
 Culler's two uses of context are not necessarily irreconcilable; but
 to make them strictly consistent, he needs to give up his assertion about
 the absolute indeterminacy of meaning. As it happens, doing this would
 not be difficult given his initial explanatory use of "context." Indeed,
 though he claims to be doing otherwise in his deconstructive maneuvers,
 Culler actually demonstrates not that meaning is always indeterminate
 but that meaning has one determinate shape in one situation and another
 in a different situation. Though a speech act's meaning can change from
 context to context, this meaning is always determinate within a given
 Critical Inquiry June 1985
 context. In the cases Culler suggests--situations in which the proposal of
 an imagined context shows how a meaning could change-one of two
 things happens: the meaning remains the same because, in the present
 situation, the proposed context is perceived as imaginary; or the meaning
 changes because, in the present situation, the proposed context is in-
 corporated into the present circumstances. In this second possibility,
 meaning changes because the context changes. In neither situation is
 meaning indeterminate; it is determinate (even if ambiguous) because
 of the context it is in.'8
 But whichever way Culler uses "context"-whether as explanatory
 concept or interpretive device-he goes far beyond simply showing that
 "if language always evades its conventions, it also depends on them"
 ("CM," p. 29). What he demonstrates instead is something he admits in
 a footnote: that the distinction between convention and context breaks
 down (see "CM," p. 30 n. 12). Indeed, all idealist theories of interpretive
 conventions tend to self-destruct when they adopt the notion of context
 to solve their conventionalist problems. Do either realist or idealist uses
 of conventions, then, provide a full account of literary interpretation?
 The answer must be no, for both epistemological positions fail to avoid
 radical embarrassments in their accounts.
 Nor do theories combining realism and idealism avoid the hermeneutic
 problems. Typically, such theories argue that realism and idealism are
 each only partially right, that neither the text alone nor the reader alone
 determines meaning, that meaning is contributed by both text and reader.
 This comfortable compromise is understandably popular in contemporary
 theory, but it solves none of the realist/idealist problems.'9 What it does
 do, however, is cagily cover up those problems by continually postponing
 their discovery. In conventionalist theories, for instance, we noted how
 some realists move from conventions in a text to conventions matched
 in a competent critic's mind. Such theories, by moving toward idealism,
 avoid the realist problem of explaining textual causation. But when those
 same theories run up against the idealist problem of determining ap-
 propriate interpretive conventions in a given situation, they turn back
 to the text for a solution. Thus, we end up with a cunningly circular
 argument: stay a realist until you have problems, then move toward
 idealism until you get embarrassed, then return to realism, and so forth
 ad infinitum. No amount of tinkering or conflating can save realist and
 idealist conventionalism from similar dead ends and vicious circles.
 It would be a mistake, however, to think that any other account-
 objective or subjective, conventionalist or nonconventionalist, or some
 admixture of these-could provide a general theory of interpretation,
 something we can call Theory with a capital T, something which could
 solve the hermeneutic problems we have discussed in this section. As
 Steven Knapp and Walter Benn Michaels have recently shown, Theory
 is impossible if it is defined as "the attempt to govern interpretations of
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 particular texts by appealing to an account of interpretation in general."20
 My critique of realist and idealist conventionalism is another version of
 the attack on Theory so defined. The solution to the realist/idealist debate
 in hermeneutics is not, then, the proposal of still another Theory. The
 way to answer the realist/idealist question "Is meaning created by the
 text or by the reader or by both?" is simply not to ask it, to stop doing
 Theory.
 2
 The anti-Theory argument opens up two possibilities: a Theorist
 can be convinced by the argument and stop doing Theory, or he can
 remain unpersuaded and continue business as usual. Let's take up the
 second and more likely scenario first. If Theory simply continues, what
 will happen? According to Knapp and Michaels, Theory depends on
 logical mistakes like Hirsch's separation of meaning from intention in
 Validity in Interpretation.21 Since to see a text as meaningful is to posit an
 author's intention and vice versa, a Theory built on the separation of
 meaning and intention includes prescriptions-"Discover meaning by
 first searching for intention"-that are impossible to follow. Thus, according
 to Knapp and Michaels, Theory in its general descriptions is illogical and
 in its specific prescriptions is inconsequential.
 But Knapp and Michaels' thesis needs to be qualified in an important
 way. Certainly they are right in claiming that Theory cannot have the
 consequences it wants to have, that it cannot be a general account that
 guarantees correct interpretations. It can, however, have other kinds of
 consequences. For example, in advocating a search for the historical
 author's meaning, intentionalists promote the critic's use of history and
 biography, what formalists call external evidence. Thus, if a critic is
 convinced by intentionalist Theory, her interpretive method would employ
 historical and biographical as well as textual facts and thus could establish
 a meaning for a text that was different from one where extratextual
 evidence was scrupulously ignored.22
 But such methodological consequences might not be exactly what
 Knapp and Michaels mean by consequences. Fish has recently made a
 related argument for Theory's inconsequentiality, an argument which
 suggests that my objection is entirely beside Knapp and Michaels' point:
 Interpretation is a function of the way human beings know, of what
 it is possible and not possible for the mind to do, of epistemology;
 and epistemology-the conditions of human knowing-is logically
 independent of any account one might give of it. I could be wrong
 about the way interpretation works, or I could be right; but the fact
 of my being either right or wrong would have no bearing whatsoever
 Rhetorical Hermeneutics
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 on the interpretive act I (or anyone persuaded by me) might per-
 form.23
 In this sense, Fish would argue, accurate or inaccurate Theory has no
 consequences.
 I agree that having a correct or incorrect account of interpretation
 neither enables nor disables the critic in doing interpretation. She interprets
 in any case. But having this rather than that hermeneutic account does
 affect the kind of interpretation done. One account, for example, might
 restrict the critic to the published text; another might encourage her to
 examine manuscript material and biographical evidence. Fish, Knapp,
 and Michaels would not, I suppose, call these effects theoretical because,
 over and above such methodological prescriptions, the Theorist claims
 that the correctness of his account determines the effects it has. The
 anti-Theorists argue that since this Theoretical claim can't be true, the
 hermeneutic account has no methodological consequences. But delimiting
 "methodological consequences" in this way is certainly misleading. True,
 Theories do not have the kind of consequences a Theorist thinks they
 have in the way he thinks they have them. Still, the attempt to do the
 impossible (to have a correct Theory that guarantees valid interpretations
 because it is correct) does have consequences for practice that directly
 follow from the theoretical attempt, consequences such as critics talking
 about the author's mind or becoming preoccupied with biography.
 This, then, is my answer to the first question, "If a Theorist continues
 doing Theory, what is he doing?" If it persuades other critics, his Theory
 continues to have consequences, but they are not exactly what he thinks
 they are. He has not provided an idealist or realist account of interpretation
 that can be appealed to in order to adjudicate readings. He has, however,
 affected critical practice by encouraging one type of interpretive method
 rather than another. But now I turn to the second question, "What will
 happen to theory if the anti-Theory argument is accepted?" Of course,
 Theory would end, but what can take its place? What happens when the
 theorist stops searching for that general account that guarantees correct
 readings? Where does he go once he quits asking realist or idealist questions
 about interpretation?
 One route to follow takes a turn toward rhetoric. I take this path in
 the rest of my essay, where I propose a rhetorical hermeneutics, an anti-
 Theory theory. Such a hermeneutics does not view shared interpretive
 strategies as the creative origin of texts (in what George Orwell calls an
 act of "collective solipsism") but, rather, as historical sets of topics, ar-
 guments, tropes, ideologies, and so forth, that determine how texts are
 established as meaningful through rhetorical exchanges. In this view,
 communities of interpreters neither discover nor create meaningful texts.
 Such communities are actually synonymous with the conditions in which
 acts of persuasion about texts take place. Concepts such as "interpretive
 629
 630 Steven Mailloux Rhetorical Hermeneutics
 strategies and "argument fields" are, we might say, simply tools for referring
 to the unformalizable context of interpretive work, work that always
 involves rhetorical action, attempts to convince others of the truth of
 explications and explanations.24
 A rhetorical hermeneutics must, by necessity, be more therapeutic
 than constructive.25 To be otherwise, to construct a new account of inter-
 pretation in general, would simply reinvoke the same old problems of
 realism and idealism. Rather than proposing still another interpretive
 system on all fours with realist and idealist theories, rhetorical hermeneutics
 tries to cure theoretical discourse of its Theoretical tendencies. It might,
 then, restate the critique I made in section 1: various hermeneutic accounts
 make the Theoretical mistake of trying to establish the foundations of
 meaning outside the setting of rhetorical exchanges. All Theories believe
 that some pure vantage point can be established beyond and ruling over
 the messy realm of interpretive practices and persuasive acts. Only in
 this way, it is thought, can correct interpretation, privileged meaning,
 be accounted for. Hermeneutic realism, for example, assumes a stability
 of meaning before any rhetorical acts take place. Meaning is determinate,
 objective, and eternally fixed because of constraints in the text itself that
 are independent of historically situated critical debates. In a strangely
 similar way, hermeneutic idealism also assumes stability of meaning outside
 situated practices. Meaning is determinate, intersubjective, and temporarily
 fixed because of constraints provided by the communal conventions in
 readers' and critics' minds. When hermeneutic idealists attempt to describe
 the system of interpretive conventions that determine meaning, either
 they describe this system as independent of rhetorical situations or they
 do not realize that the conventions themselves are the topic of critical
 debate at specific historical moments. In either case, idealists make a
 mistake similar to that of realists by presupposing the possibility of meaning
 outside specific historical contexts of rhetorical practices.
 Rhetorical hermeneutics tries to correct this mistake, but simply
 showing the problems with hermeneutic realism and idealism is not enough.
 It must also explain why realism and idealism are such attractive theories
 of interpretation in the first place. We can best do this by redefining
 realist and idealist claims in terms of a rhetorical hermeneutics. What
 exactly do these past theories teach us about rhetorical exchanges in
 interpretation? The realists' claims about constraints in the text testify
 to the common assumption in critical debates that interpretive statements
 are about texts. References to the text are therefore privileged moves in
 justifying interpretations. The idealists' claims about the constitutive power
 of critical presuppositions exemplify the common pluralist belief that if
 you change the questions being asked about texts, you change the answers
 you get, and if you can convince someone else to ask your questions, you
 are that much closer to convincing her to accept your interpretation of
 a specific text. A rhetorical hermeneutics does not reject any of these
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 assumptions. In fact, it uses their widespread acceptability to explain the
 rhetorical dynamics of academic interpretation in late twentieth-century
 America. But to acknowledge the power of these assumptions in rhetorical
 exchanges today does not entail making any claims about whether they
 are epistemologically true. Such epistemological questions are simply
 beside the point for a rhetorical hermeneutics. Asking them always leads
 back to the dead ends of realism and idealism.
 Rhetorical hermeneutics, then, gives up the goals of Theory and
 continues theorizing about interpretation only therapeutically, exposing
 the problems with foundationalism and explaining the attraction of realist
 and idealist positions. But a rhetorical hermeneutics has more to do: it
 should also provide histories of how particular theoretical and critical
 discourses have evolved. Why? Because acts of persuasion always take
 place against an ever-changing background of shared and disputed as-
 sumptions, questions, assertions, and so forth. Any full rhetorical analysis
 of interpretation must therefore describe this tradition of discursive prac-
 tices in which acts of interpretive persuasion are embedded.26 Thus rhe-
 torical hermeneutics leads inevitably to rhetorical histories, and it is to
 one of these histories I now turn.
 3
 Recently more and more attention has been paid to the institutional
 politics of interpretation, and this attention has proven salutary for histories
 of literary criticism.27 Traditional histories tended to minimize the im-
 portance of social, political, and economic factors in the development of
 American literary study; the focus was almost exclusively on abstract
 intellectual history. In the introduction to one paradigmatic text, Literary
 Criticism: A Short History, Wimsatt and Cleanth Brooks claimed to "have
 written a history of ideas about verbal art and about its elucidation and
 criticism," stressing "that in a history of this sort the critical idea has
 priority over all other kinds of material."28 Such histories of critical ideas
 not only downplayed the political and economic context in which those
 ideas developed; they also ignored the effects of literary study's insti-
 tutionalization within the American university of the late nineteenth
 century. In a moment I will try to show how this historical event transformed
 the critical tradition by adding specific institutional requirements to the
 more general cultural and political determinations that affected the rhe-
 torical shape of American literary study.
 More comprehensive than descriptions of critical ideas is a newer
 kind of critical history: explanations of literary study in terms of social,
 political, and economic forces. In English in America, for example, Richard
 Ohmann shows how "industrial society organizes the labor of people who
 work with their minds"; in The Critical Twilight, John Fekete situates
 Critical Inquiry
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 modern critical theory within the American network of social ideologies
 manipulated by corporate capitalism.29 Such studies take account of literary
 criticism as part of a discipline which is situated within an institution,
 the modern university. Indeed, Ohmann, Fekete, and others have done
 valuable work in revealing the institutional mechanisms that constrain
 the development of academic literary study. But though these historical
 analyses do acknowledge the importance of institutional constraints, such
 determinations are secondary to their primary interest in economic and
 political formations in society at large. The result is that (at least in
 Fekete's case) such accounts sometimes overlook or distort the institutional
 role of literary studies in the development of critical ideology. Whereas
 Fekete argues that, in the modern critical tradition, "cultural methodology
 reveals its politics directly,"30 I would say that social and political formations
 reveal themselves only indirectly, through the mediation of criticism's
 place within institutions for producing knowledge-universities generally
 and literature departments specifically. That is, the establishment, main-
 tenance, and development of literary study in universities can only be
 partially explained through analysis of factors outside these institutions.
 A more intrainstitutional explanation must also be attempted because,
 once the institutional space has been established for literary study, the
 specific interpretive work and rhetorical practices within this space seem
 only crudely affected by extrainstitutional factors.
 Let me use the institutional history of New Critical formalism to
 illustrate what I mean. Traditional accounts of critical ideas and more
 recent sociopolitical analyses of criticism give a prominent place to the
 hegemony of New Criticism in American literary study during the 1940s
 and 1950s. Traditional histories of criticism usually recount the genealogy
 of New Critical ideas but fail to explain adequately why those ideas came
 to dominate literary study. Sociopolitical analyses like those of Ohmann
 and Fekete have much more explanatory power. For instance, Fekete
 skillfully shows how Agrarian social ideology, which attacked modern
 industrial civilization, was easily accommodated to corporate capitalism
 through the institutionalization of New Criticism within English de-
 partments. Fekete's otherwise insightful analysis, however, does not grant
 the institutional setting of literary study its full share in determining the
 shape and hegemony of New Criticism. In fact, Fekete distorts the nature
 of the institutionalized discipline when he suggests that New Criticism
 filled a vacuum created in the 1930s by the failure of socialist criticism
 within the discipline.31 Actually, there was no vacuum: literary study
 within the academy was dominated by historical scholarship, which provided
 the discipline with a professional training program, shared research goals,
 and interpretive conventions for viewing literature. The rhetorical shape
 of New Criticism-its theory and practice-was influenced significantly
 by its institutional attempt to displace this scholarship as the dominant
 approach to literary texts. To understand exactly what was required of
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 New Criticism, we need to trace the institutional history of literary study.
 In what follows I will briefly present a rhetorical version of this history,
 emphasizing only those forces and events that contribute to an intra-
 institutional analysis of why New Criticism achieved its persuasive authority
 in the American study of literature. Such a rhetorical history follows
 directly from the rhetorical hermeneutics I have proposed because, to
 understand the discursive practices of interpretive rhetoric, we must also
 understand their past and present relations to the nondiscursive practices
 of institutions.
 In the 1870s and 1880s the American university expanded its collegiate
 curriculum to include scientific and humanistic disciplines previously
 ignored, and it utilized the model of German scientific research for its
 conception of knowledge production.32 The influence of this scientific
 ideology can be seen in the particular way literary study was institution-
 alized. Various critical approaches were available to those in the university
 who wanted literature to be made part of the curriculum-for example,
 moral or didactic criticism, impressionism, and liberal social criticism.
 But the approach that made possible the institutionalization was German
 philology, the scientific study of modern languages and a linguistic and
 historical approach to literature.33 Philology provided the scientific rhetoric
 needed to justify literary and linguistic study to the rest of the academic
 community. This scholarship allowed the discipline to take advantage of
 all the mechanisms for the production and dissemination of knowledge
 that other institutionalized disciplines were developing. Philological study
 provided a methodology that could be used for the classroom practices
 derived from the German scientific model: the seminar, the specialized
 lecture, and the research paper. It also made use of the agencies that
 the emphasis on research had created for the diffusion of knowledge:
 scholarly journals, university presses, and the annual conventions of
 learned societies.
 But philology did not simply plug into an institutional compartment
 set aside for literary studies; it also effectively designed the interior of
 that compartment. In the early twentieth century, philology allowed the
 discipline to develop historical scholarship in all its forms (source and
 influence studies, examinations of historical backgrounds, and so forth).
 Indeed, philological research provided much of the agenda for the future
 of the discipline. The narrower view of philology gave literary study such
 basic projects as textual editing, variorum commentaries, bibliographical
 descriptions, and linguistic analyses. The broader view of philology gave
 historical scholarship its most ambitious rationale: philology as "the cultural
 history of a nation."34 As philology modulated into a less linguistically
 oriented historicism in America, it maintained the ideal of this study of
 a national spirit. Thus philology did its part for Americanism in the
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 academy's cultural politics as the United States emerged a world power
 during the first decades of the century.
 In the first quarter of the twentieth century, then, philological research
 and historical scholarship filled the institutional space provided for literary
 studies. These communal practices shaped and were shaped by the in-
 stitutional nature of the discipline, and the functions they served became
 an important part of the institutional demands that the rhetoric of any
 new approach needed to address. I would now like to outline some of
 the ways in which New Criticism effectively served and, in turn, revised
 institutional functions when it came to dominate the discipline by displacing
 historical scholarship.35
 First of all, New Criticism provided an ingenious rhetorical accom-
 modation to scientific ideology. As I've noted, scientific research provided
 the model of knowledge production through which literary study and
 several other disciplines were institutionalized. The prestige of science
 continued to grow within the academy during the early twentieth century,
 but at the same time some members of the humanistic disciplines grew
 increasingly discontented with scientific ideology and its positivistic as-
 sumptions. In literary study, these two conflicting trends came together
 in the way the New Critics theorized about literature and criticism in the
 second quarter of the century. On the one hand, New Critics defended
 literature against the onslaught of positivist values by claiming that literary
 discourse presented a kind of knowledge unavailable in scientific discourse.
 On the other hand, New Criticism itself was promoted as a "scientific"
 method of getting at this nonscientific, literary knowledge. This strategic
 manipulation of scientific ideology can be seen in the rhetoric of John
 Crowe Ransom. In the early 1940s, Ransom distinguished science from
 poetry, arguing that poetry recovers "the denser and more refractory
 original world which we know loosely through our perceptions and mem-
 ories." Poetry treats "an order of existence ... which cannot be treated
 in scientific discourse."36 Though he distanced literature from science,
 Ransom advocated a closer relationship between literary criticism and
 science: "Criticism must become more scientific, or precise and systematic,
 and this means that it must be developed by the collective and sustained
 effort of learned persons-which means that its proper seat is in the
 universities."37 Here Ransom recognized the importance of proposing a
 "scientific" method of criticism to replace the "scientific" method of phil-
 ological scholarship dominating the discipline. In this way, New Criticism
 accommodated itself to the institutionally entrenched model of knowledge
 production and simultaneously provided a defense of its subject matter
 as autonomous and uniquely worthy of study. It is beside the point that
 New Criticism actually laid claim to only a few characteristics of scientific
 method (technical precision, objectivity, neutrality) or that sciences such
 as physics were calling these scientific ideas into question. What is important
 institutionally is that New Criticism rhetorically adapted to the scientific
 Rhetorical Hermeneutics
 June 1985 635
 ideology in such a way that it provided continuity as well as revitalization
 for the discipline.
 This revitalization included a humanistic critique of carefully chosen
 aspects of scientific ideology. Some New Critics extended a humanistic
 attack on scientific relativism to the scientism of historical scholarship.
 In "Criticism, History, and Critical Relativism," Brooks took exception
 to Frederick Pottle's historical study, The Idiom of Poetry, and was particularly
 upset with the book's historicist premises. Critical evaluation is always
 relative, Pottle argued, because "poetry always expresses the basis of
 feeling (or sensibility) of the age in which it was written" and therefore
 earlier poetry can never be judged by twentieth-century standards. "The
 poetry of an age [in a collective sense] never goes wrong."38 Brooks opposed
 these historicist assumptions with his own formalist claims about poetic
 structures that are transhistorical: "functional imagery, irony, and com-
 plexity of attitude" can be used to evaluate poems in all ages ("CHCR,"
 p. 209). Brooks argued further that a debilitating relativism would certainly
 result if historical study continued to ignore the universal criteria of
 formalist evaluation. "I am convinced," he wrote, "that, once we are
 committed to critical relativism, there can be no stopping short of a
 complete relativism in which critical judgments will disappear altogether"
 ("CHCR," p. 212). Attributing this growing danger to the fact that "teachers
 of the Humanities have tended to comply with the [scientific] spirit of
 the age rather than to resist it," Brooks argued that in literary studies
 we have tried "to be more objective, more 'scientific'-and in practice we
 usually content ourselves with relating the work in question to the cultural
 matrix out of which it came" and thus irresponsibly avoid normative
 judgments ("CHCR," pp. 213, 198). The New Critical accommodation
 to scientific ideology, then, simultaneously approved one form of objectivity
 and criticized another: Ransom advocated a "good" kind of formalist
 objectivity in interpreting literature, and Brooks condemned a "bad" kind
 of historicist objectivity in not evaluating it. In this strategic way, New
 Criticism incorporated into its rhetorical appeal the strengths of both
 scientific and humanistic programs within the institutionalized discipline.
 New Criticism satisfied a second institutional requirement when it
 became an effective means for increased specialization. The New Critical
 assumption that literature was an ordered object independent of social
 and historical context entailed a formalist methodology that could reveal
 the unified complexity of that literary object. Since literary meaning was
 also assumed to be independent of authorial intention and reader response,
 New Critics stressed the details of the text in-and-of-itself. They therefore
 developed their methodology by focusing on the literary text in a vacuum,
 or, as they preferred to say, on literature as literature. New Critics thus
 tried to elaborate a technical criticism that derived its interpretive categories
 exclusively from literature and not psychology, sociology, or history. This
 rejection of "extrinsic" approaches conveniently included a rejection of
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 the historical assumptions of philological scholarship. The rhetoric of
 this new "intrinsic" criticism served the institutional function of reinforcing
 the independence of literary study within the academy, an accomplishment
 that was part of a general institutional tendency in American universities
 between 1910 and 1960. As Stephen Toulmin points out:
 During those years . . . the academic and artistic professions moved
 into a new phase of specialization. Each "discipline" or "profession"
 was characterized by, and organized as the custodian of, its own
 corpus of formal techniques, into which newcomers had to be initiated
 and accredited, as apprentices. So, there was a general tendency
 for each of the professions to pull away from its boundaries with
 others, and to concentrate on its own central, essential concerns.39
 In literary study, it was New Criticism that fulfilled this institutional need
 for increasing differentiation and specialization.
 A third function of New Criticism was its usefulness as a means of
 further professionalization. Since institutional specialization also requires
 professionalism, the discipline of literary studies also needed an approach
 that fulfilled what Ohmann calls "the professional mission of developing
 the central body of knowledge and the professional service performed
 for clients."40 New Criticism easily satisfied both of these professional
 requirements. It redefined the nature of the knowledge produced by the
 discipline, moving it from the historical and linguistic knowledge of philol-
 ogy to formalist knowledge about the literary text in-and-of-itself. It also
 changed the priority of the discipline's practices as it moved away from
 scholarship to criticism, giving ultimate value to explication of individual
 texts. The formalist assumptions and textual explications presented the
 discipline with a new pedagogy, one that Brooks and Robert Penn Warren's
 Understanding Poetry (1938) rapidly taught to members of the profession.
 More slowly, these same New Critical assumptions and practices also
 displaced philological scholarship as a methodology for training and
 accrediting the growing number of new recruits to the profession.
 The close readings of New Critical formalism represent the fulfillment
 of the final institutional function I will point out. New Criticism constituted
 a discursive practice for the discipline, one that could be easily reproduced
 and disseminated within a growing profession. It gave the members new
 things to do with old texts, using an interpretive machine that was easy
 to operate without the traditional and lengthy training of philology.
 Literary critics exploited this machine to fill the increasing number of
 monographs and journals the expanding institution demanded.
 In the 1940s and 1950s, New Critical formalism showed that it could
 fulfill all the institutional demands I have outlined. It did this more
 persuasively than any other available critical approach, even as it si-
 multaneously modified these demands. Again, as with philology, the
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 dominant critical practice and the institutional space were mutually de-
 fining. Today, debates in critical theory take place in terms set by New
 Critical formalism: Is authorial intention relevant to correct interpretation?
 Is textual meaning separate from reader response? Is the literary work
 independent of historical context? But even more important than setting
 the current agenda for theoretical debate is the hegemonic discourse
 contributed by New Critical close readings, the detailed explications of
 individual texts. It is no accident that the most popular forms of post-
 structuralist criticism are those that most closely resemble the interpretive
 rhetoric of New Criticism, a rhetoric emphasizing the complexity of the
 unique literary work. Thus, despite being constantly attacked and sup-
 posedly outmoded, formalist rhetoric still remains a dominant presence
 in literary thought and critical practice within the discipline of American
 literary studies.41
 By presenting this schematic history, I am not arguing that intra-
 institutional accounts are the only relevant narratives for understanding
 the rhetorical evolution of the academic study of literature. In fact, I
 believe that such histories must be supplemented by more comprehensive
 analyses relating the institutionalized discipline to the sociopolitical forces
 originating outside the university. By including this brief history in my
 presentation, however, I do mean to illustrate how a rhetorical hermeneutics
 is composed of therapeutic theory and rhetorical histories. More exactly,
 such narratives are not simply added onto theory; rather, rhetorical theory
 must become rhetorical history. Thus, rhetorical hermeneutics joins other
 recent attempts to incorporate rhetoric at the level of literary theory and
 its analysis of critical practice.42 Such attempts share a suspicion of Theory
 and a preoccupation with history, a skepticism toward foundational ac-
 counts of interpretation in general, and an attraction to narratives sur-
 rounding specific rhetorical acts and their particular political contexts.
 Such attempts place literary theory and criticism within a cultural con-
 versation, the dramatic, unending conversation of history that is the
 "primal scene of rhetoric."43 A rhetorical hermeneutics, then, is not so
 much theory leading to history but theory as history.
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